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Abstract
For developing a better comprehension of the large-scale effects of a cyber attack, the
paper examines the effects of infections with self-replicating malware — described by an
SIR model — on a distributed system. A Lanchester model of military forces engaged
in kinetic combat serves as sample system affected by the malware. Its game-like setting
illustrates the effects of malware in a concise way. Corresponding evaluation criteria are
derived. Basic knowledge about the expected circumstances restricts the set of scenarios
to be analyzed. Remaining uncertainties are taken into account by applying Monte-Carlo
simulations, whereby the scenarios to be processed are selected randomly by information-
theoretic principles. The resulting framework allows a model-based calculation of the risk
and the fraction of scenarios, in which malware attacks can assure the win for kinetically
inferior forces, depending on the specifical circumstances. For showing the value and the
validity of the method, the proposed analysis method is applied to an exemplary situation, in
which sparse knowledge causes large uncertainties about the situation. Based on the example
we have derived some key findings: (1) Malware attacks affecting availability can turn around
the outcome of the kinetic combat in a significant fraction of scenarios. (2) Cyber capabilities
tend to soften out kinetic superiority or inferiority. (3) Using the most aggressive malware
is not necessarily the best decision for an aggressor. (4) Starting countermeasures against a
malware attack at the earliest possible time is not always the best decision for a defender.
1 Introduction
Among all threats related to cyber security, self-replicating malware, like viruses and worms, are
some of the most important ones. Due to the capability of self-reproduction, the initial infection
of a single, unimportant system component may cause catastrophic damage to the overall system
at the end — maybe even a complete state. The disproportionality between the low effort and
the potentially significant damage qualifies the usage of malware for large scale attacks and cyber
warfare [10,23]. Indeed, the Cyber Conflict Studies Association CCSA1 lists numerous incidents
at nation level. We mention some examples: In 1998, the NATO attacked infrastructure and
command & control structures in Serbia during the Kosovo war with self-replicating malware [9],
enabling an especially successful air campaign. In April 2007, Estonia was attacked at cyber
level, presumably by Russia [3]. The attack has targeted ministries, banks, and media and
caused injuries due to riots resulting from the effectiveness of the attack. Trojans have enforced
a temporary shutdown of the computer network of the German Bundestag in 2015 [17,26]. Other
examples of attacks with self-replicating malware can be found in [4, 8, 14,24].
Mechanisms and consequences of such large scale attacks do not seem to be well understood yet.
One reason may be that malware infections are typically discussed from the perspective of IT
security exclusively. This leads to considerations that neglect the effects of a malware infection,
however. In an embedded system, that contains several computers as subsystems, each computer
may provide specific functionalities to the overall system. A malware infection of a specific
computer may affect these functionalities individually. For an adequate assessment of the effects
of malware infections, it is thus necessary to take the (non-)availability of functionalities into
account. Accordingly, we analyze the effects of a malware infection based on a model representing
both the cyber security and the availability perspective. The reduction of the availability caused
1http://www.cyberconflict.org
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by the malware infection provides a natural loss function and allows an objective and quantitative
assessment of the malware effects.
This paper uses a Lanchester model to analyze an exemplary system that has been affected by
malware. The Lanchester model describes a conventional battle (i.e. kinetic combat) between
two opposing homogeneous military forces Blue and Red. This application was chosen due to its
simplicity, which may enable a more direct insight into the interactions between availability and
malware. Additionally, the game scenario of the Lanchester model provides a natural evaluation
measure of the outcome. The propagation of malware across the forces is represented by a SIR-
like epidemic model. The discussion of the influence of malware problems on the availability of
technical systems seems to be relevant in the future as more and more wars will have not only
a kinetic component but also a cyber part, where malware will play most probably a prominent
role. Therefore, getting a better understanding of the impact of malware might have significant
importance.
Several papers are considering co-occurring kinetic combat and cyber warfare with malware.
Mishra and Prajapati [21] discuss cyber warfare based on a differential equation system, but
they do not take availability aspects into account; instead, they focus on a stability analysis.
McMorrow [18] defines the transfer of findings provided by biological epidemics to the cyber
domain as one of the objectives for the development of a deeper understanding of large scale
cyber attacks. Schramm [25] has developed a corresponding model combining a kinetic battle
situation with a one-sided malware attack based on the SIR model [12]. Its symmetrization by
Yildiz [32] assures that both forces have the same capabilities and vulnerabilities. Both [31]
and [32] examine and expand the models of Schramm.
We contribute to the existing literature by developing a computational analysis approach, in
which available knowledge and remaining uncertainties are taken into account by Monte Carlo
simulations. In this way, the analysis evaluates the situation with regard to the current circum-
stances. The abandonment of deriving universally valid statements about the interplay between
kinetic and cyber combat is traded for more concise evaluations.
The paper is structured as follows. The Lanchester/SIR model used for our investigation of
malware effects is presented in section 2, both validity and realism of the model are discussed.
Section 3 develops our concept of a computational analysis by simulating the evolution of a
given situation. It is shown, how evaluation measures can be deduced for assessing the outcome
of such a simulation. The stochastic aspects of the proposed analysis approach are developed in
section 4. Especially the utilization of information-theoretic principles for dealing with uncer-
tainties by a Monte-Carlo approach is indicated. Section 5 applies the proposed concept to an
exemplary situation characterized by sparse knowledge and large uncertainties. The derivation
of key findings from the results is used for demonstrating the value and validity of the proposed
analysis approach. A discussion of methods and results is given in section 6. The paper closes
with a summary of our contributions and an outlook to future research in section 7.
2 An Integrated Kinetic/Cyber Conflict Model
2.1 Model Structure
As mentioned in the introduction, our model of a combined kinetic and cyber combat is based
on the work of Schramm [25] and Yildiz [32]. Accordingly, our model is composed of two main
components. First, a submodel representing kinetic combat by a Lanchester model, and, second,
a submodel representing cyber combat by a SIR model of malware epidemics.
Kinetic Combat Component The kinetic combat is modeled using Lanchester equations
[13,16], which considers two opposing homogeneous forces Blue and Red. The model consists of
two coupled deterministic, time-continuous ordinary differential equations.
db
dt = −δrrp(t)bq(t)
dr
dt = −δbbp(t)rq(t)
(1)
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wherein b(t) and r(t) represent the sizes of the blue and red force at time t fulfilling the initial
conditions b(0), r(0) ≥ 0. In the following, parameters associated with the blue resp. red force
are referred to by an index b resp. r. Both forces simultaneously begin fighting at time t = 0 with
effectiveness δb and δr, respectively. The parameter p determines the capabilities of the forces as
an attacker, whereas q does so for the defender. Thus, equation system (1) is well-defined unless
one of r or b becomes zero during the evolution. This problem is discussed in more detail in
section 2.2. Despite of their simplicity, Lanchester equations are capable to describe large battles
at least in some situations [7].
Malware Component The malware component represents the malware propagation across
a force. It is described by a variant of the SIR-model, which was developed by Kermack &
McKendrick [12]. Though originally developed for the description of biological epidemics, it was
successfully applied to the propagation of malware (e.g. [20, 27, 28]). The notation reflects the
three different compartments S, I,R of the model representing Susceptible (here called vulner-
able), Infected, and Recovered (here called patched) force elements. The replacement of the
term ’recovery’ by the term ’patching’ takes also account of the merely superficial correspon-
dence between biological pathogens and malware concerning the ending of an infection. In the
biological domain, organisms can typically self-recover, whereas force elements with a malware
infection can not patch themselves. A vulnerable element in contact with an infected individual
may become infected itself with a rate β. Infected elements may be patched with a rate γ¯ and
may become patched in this way. We assume that patching of infected systems can only happen
within a force and that the malware propagation within a force is homogeneous. We assume,
that patched elements are immune against the used malware. Furthermore, we restrict our con-
siderations to a single malware code only; infections with a combination of different malware
codes are not taken into account.
The assumption of a homogeneous malware propagation may not be true in practice. Some
force elements will perhaps be more vulnerable than others, which thus will suffer from a faster
propagating malware epidemic. Giving up the idealization of homogeneity would have introduced
many additional parameters for characterizing the inhomogeneity. Furthermore, it seems unclear
which degree of inhomogeneity should be allowed at all. In order to avoid complications, the
authors have decided to leave it at the simplifying assumption of homogeneous forces. Thus, our
model is inappropriate for representing e.g. co-occurring aur and land combat.
According to our assumptions, the equations of the basic SIR-model are defined as follows:
dS
dt
= − βS(t)I(t)
dI
dt
= βS(t)I(t) − γ¯I(t)
dR
dt
= γ¯I(t)
(2)
Concerning initial conditions, it holds S(0), I(0), R(0) ≥ 0.
Component Integration In our model, Lanchester and SIR components are closely interwo-
ven with each other. This is caused by the necessity to represent a reduced kinetic effectiveness of
force elements, which are infected by malware. For realizing this requirement, each compartment
of the SIR-model is considered as an individual type of force elements in the Lanchester model.
It resembles the fact that combat takes place at two levels simultaneously — kinetic and cyber
— according to our assumptions.
In the following, we give a short description of the parameters added in the integration pro-
cess. This includes the parameters with a now (slightly) modified meaning compared to a pure
Lanchester or SIR-model. According to the integration approach, parameters specifically char-
acterizing ’interactions’ between Lanchester and SIR component can not be identified. In the
next paragraph, the overall structure of the resulting Lanchester/SIR model is presented.
The initial malware infection, that triggers a malware epidemic, is caused by a malware attack
of the vulnerable and patched systems of the adversarial force. The effect of a malware attack
is represented by α. It gives a flow from vulnerable force elements to infected force elements.
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Although there is a large spectrum of infection mechanism [25], in this paper only a single generic
mechanism is considered. The kinetic effectiveness δ of infected force elements is reduced by a
factor η ∈ [0, 1]. The parameter δ is restored to its original value after patching. The patching
action can be applied to infected resp. vulnerable systems with rate γ˜ resp. γ. Once patched,
this specific malware can not cause a new infection. Patching of infected systems requires an
interaction with vulnerable or patched systems. Infected systems can not patch other systems
or themselves. Force elements being attacked in kinetic combat suffer losses independent of
their malware state, i.e. vulnerable, infected, and patched systems are affected according to the
same attrition rate; the malware state has an influence on the capabilities of force elements as
attackers, not as defenders.
The assumption of a loss rate of force elements independent of their malware state seems to
be justified in the case of e.g. tanks, which consist more or less of only the main gun used
offensively. Ships and aircraft, apart from that, are usually equipped with many technical systems
providing capabilities of self-defense. If these systems are infected with malware, one may expect
a higher loss rate for infected force elements compared to force elements without a malware
infection. Additionally, the representation of small forces via differential equations is eventually
inappropriate. As a consequence, the developed model may be better applicable to land warfare
than to air or sea combat. If suitable, however, parameters describing the dependence of the loss
rate of force elements on their malware state can easily be implemented in the model.
Blue Force
Red Force
Vulnerable Sr Infected Ir Patched Rr
Destroyed Dr
Vulnerable Sb Infected Ib Patched Rb
Destroyed Db
βr γ˜r
γr
p, q p, q p, q
βb γ˜b
γb
p, q p, q p, q
δb, δr ηb, ηr αb, αr
Kinetic Effects
Malware Effects
Figure 1: Red force and blue force fighting against each other on two levels: kinetic and malware
The assumptions on the kinetic and cyber components and the interactions between them lead
to the model structure in Figure 1. The compartments S, I, and R already known from the SIR
model were supplemented by the compartment D of destroyed force elements for bookkeeping
purposes.
For a better understanding, we will now quantify the flows between the compartments belonging
to the blue force; the flows for Red correspond to the flows given for Blue due to the intended
symmetry of the model. We will use the designation N := S + I + R for the still existing force
elements.
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• βbSbIb/Nb is the flow from Sb to Ib due to malware infections.
• γbSb is the flow from Sb to Rb representing a patching of the vulnerability before an infection
occurs.
• γ˜bIb(Sb + Rb)/Nb is the flow from Ib to Rb representing a patch of the vulnerability for
infected force elements. Accordingly, the removal of the malware infection is considered as
part of the patching process.
Some remarks concerning the normalization of the flows have to be added. The simplicity of
equation (2) is due to the assumption of a constant ’population’ size. Since in the developed
Lanchester/SIR model concurrently to the epidemic a kinetic combat occurs inflicting losses
among the force elements, a normalization of the epidemic-related interaction terms becomes
necessary. The normalization preserves the basic behavior of the Lanchester and the SIR com-
ponent despite of eventually decreasing numbers of force elements. For the interaction terms
related to kinetic combat and the malware attack — see below — the absolute numbers of force
elements are of interest, however, because they determine the scale of effects. Accordingly, a
normalization is omitted for them.
Now, the flows related to kinetic combat are discussed. Following the structure of the equation
system (1), the attrition rate of Red on Blue is δr(Sr + Rr + ηrIr)p. The factor ηr in this term
describes the reduced effectiveness of infected force elements. The affected elements of Blue are
Sq, Iq, or Rq.
• δr(Spr +Rpr + ηrIpr ) · Sqb is the flow from Sb to Db due to kinetic combat losses.
• δr(Spr +Rpr + ηrIpr ) · Iqb is the flow from Ib to Db due to kinetic combat losses.
• δr(Spr +Rpr + ηrIpr ) ·Rqb is the flow from Rb to Db due to kinetic combat losses.
• αr(Sr +Rr) · Sb is the flow from Sb to Ib due to a malware attack of Red.
In the end, we get four equations for each of the two forces. We only give the equations for Blue,
since the equations for Red have symmetric form. Additional remarks about the basic structure
of such an equation systems can be found in [25,32].
dSb
dt
=− βbSbIb/Nb − γbSb
− δr(Spr +Rpr + ηrIpr ) · Sqb
− αr(Sr +Rr) · Sb
dIb
dt
= βbSbIb/Nb − γ˜bIb(Sb +Rb)/Nb
− δr(Spr +Rpr + ηrIpr ) · Iqb
+ αr(Sr +Rr) · Sb
dRb
dt
= γbSb + γ˜bIb(Sb +Rb)/Nb
− δr(Spr +Rpr + ηrIpr ) ·Rqb
dDb
dt
= δr(S
p
r +R
p
r + ηrI
p
r ) · (Sqb + Iqb +Rqb)
(3)
Model parameters are listed in table 1. It also includes time parameters of the model extension
discussed later in section 2.3. Except of p, q, the given parameters can be chosen independently
for Blue and Red. As initial conditions, the non-negativity S(0), I(0), R(0), D(0) ≥ 0 of all
compartments is required.
Since the integration of a Lanchester model with an SIR-model is not new, we want to point out
the novelties compared to the already existing models in Schramm [25] and Yildiz [32]. Though
it is not our aim to produce a more general model as an end in itself, some generalizations
were introduced for making the model more realistic. Concerning the Lanchester component, we
added the exponents p, q for a better fit of historic battles [7,15]. Concerning the SIR component,
we distinguish the patching rates γ, γ˜ of vulnerable and already infected force elements, because
we safely assume that the removal of a malware infection takes additional time. Furthermore,
the intensity of the malware attack is given by a parameter α.
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Parameter
Group
Parameter with Description Parameter
Range
Kinetic
Combat
δ Kinetic effectiveness of vulnerable and patched elements δ ≥ 0
η Effectiveness reduction of infected elements η ∈ [0, 1]
p First Lanchester parameter p ≥ 0
q Second Lanchester parameter q ≥ 0
Cyber
Combat
α Malware attack rate α ≥ 0
Malware
Spreading β Infection rate β ≥ 0
γ Patch rate for vulnerable elements γ ∈ [0, 1]
γ˜ Patch rate for infected elements γ˜ ≥ 0
Timing ∆tatt Time difference ∆tatt = tatt−tkin between the start tatt of
the malware attack and the start tkin of kinetic combat.
∆tatt ∈ R
∆tmal Duration of malware attack ∆tmal ≥ 0
∆tpat Time difference ∆tpat = tpat − tkin between the start tpat
of the patching process and the start tkin of the kinetic
combat
∆tpat ∈ R
Table 1: Parameters occurring in the equation system (3), supplemented by the model extensions
concerning timed events in section 2.3. Except of p, q, the given parameters can be chosen
independently for Blue and Red.
2.2 Model Consistency
The kinetic interaction terms like δr(Spr +Rpr + ηrIpr ) · Sqb require further discussion. For q → 0,
one gets Sqb → 1 independently of the value of S. This means, the losses inflicted on the blue
force by Red become independent of the current size Nb(t) of the blue force. For Sb close to
0, the level of Sb thus becomes negative. Similarly, for p → 0 the factor (Spr + Rpr + ηrIpr ) is
approximately equal to 2 + ηr independently of the values of Sr, Ir, and Rr. Thus, a red force
already annihilated can inflict arbitrarily large losses on Blue.
For avoiding such unphysical behavior, a barrier function f(x) = (exp(−1/x))0.0001 is introduced
with f(x)→ 0 for x→ 0 and f(x) ≈ 1 otherwise. Replacing δr(Spr +Rpr + ηrIpr ) · Sqb by
δr(f(Sr)S
p
r + f(Rr)R
p
r + ηrf(Ir)I
p
r ) · f(Sb)Sqb (4)
(and analogously for the other kinetic interaction terms) avoids the occurrence of compartments
with negative levels but preserves the system dynamics for Sb > 0 approximately. For avoiding
bulky expressions, we will use the designation xa := f(x)xa. This simplifies term (4) to δr(S
p
r +
Rpr + ηrI
p
r ) · Sqb . If we speak about the equation system (3) in the following, we always mean
the system modified by the barrier function f(x) as described above. Furthermore, the temporal
derivative of a compartment level C is designated as C ′ in the future.
Proposition 1 (Consistency of the Modified Equation System).
a) δr(S
p
r +R
p
r + ηrI
p
r ) · Sqb → 0 for Sb → 0 or for Sr, Ir, Rr → 0 and δr(Spr +Rpr + ηrIpr ) · Sqb ≈
δr(S
p
r +R
p
r + ηrI
p
r ) · Sqb otherwise. Corresponding statements are valid for Sr, Ib, Ir, Rb, Rr.
6
Figure 2: A typical behavior of the equation system (3). Besides of the number of vulnerable,
infected, and patched elements for both forces, the overall numbers of available and destroyed
force elements are shown. Due to malware attacks applied by both forces, the red force is stronger
at the beginning but will still lose in the end.
b) Sb → 0⇒ S′b → 0 and Sr → 0⇒ S′r → 0.
c) Nr → 0⇒ N ′b → 0 and Nb → 0⇒ N ′r → 0.
Sketch of Proof.
a) According to the definition of the operator , it holds Sb → 0 for Sb → 0 and Sb ≈ Sb
otherwise. Corresponding statements are valid for Sr, Ib, Ir, Rb, Rr. The statement is an
immediate consequence.
b) The condition Sb → 0 assures that all flow terms in the expression of S′b in equations
system (3) become 0; concerning the flow term representing kinetic combat, this results from
part a). The claim follows for Sb. The proof for Sr proceeds in an analogous way.
c) The assertion Nr → 0 leads immediately to Sr, Rr, Ir → 0 due to the non-negativity of the
compartment levels. Thus it holds Spr +Rpr+ηrI
p
r → 0 and moreover δr(Spr +Rpr+ηrIpr )·Sqb →
0. This gives N ′b = S
′
b + I
′
b +R
′
b → 0, which is the claim.
The preceding proposition excludes the two types of unphysical behavior mentioned at the be-
ginning of this section after introduction of the barrier function f(x). Such negativities can also
be generated at the computational level. For avoiding overshooting effects leading to negative
compartment levels, the size of the time steps has to be chosen small enough. A less extreme
barrier function f(x) — i.e. a barrier function with a smaller exponent — may avoid negativities
more reliably, but its influence on the dynamics of the system will be stronger.
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2.3 Model Extensions
Since the starts of cyber and kinetic warfare may not necessarily coincide, we extend the model
by allowing an onset of kinetic combat, malware attack and patching process independent from
each other. In this way, situations like a preparation of a kinetic battle by a supporting malware
attack or a late start of countermeasures due to a delayed provision of appropriate patches can be
modeled. Additionally, the duration of the malware attack can be restricted by ∆tmal. An early
stop of the malware attack can sometimes be useful for covering up the source of the malware
attack. Before the start and after the end of an action like a malware attack, the execution of
the action is prohibited by appropriate parameter settings. Inbetween, the action parameters
are set to their effective values. Details of the translation of the events resulting from the timing
parameters given in table 1 to corresponding changes of the parameter settings are given in
table 2. If we talk about the equation system (3), we always consider its extension by the events
of table 2. For a better understanding, figure 3 depicts events and time intervals used in the text
graphically.
The model extension described above gives up the simultaneity of the start of kinetic combat,
malware attack and patching process. This generalization is another contribution to make the
Lanchester/SIR model easier applicable to real-life situations. For example, a start of the mal-
ware attack and of the patching process at the same time will happen only in rare occasions.
Usually, the force under malware attack will need some time to recognize the attack and to
initiate corresponding countermeasures. Thus, the extension enables the modeling of much more
situations that are likely to occur in practice.
The selection of added details are of course a bit subjective and thus subject to debate. Indeed,
one might think of many other details and complications maybe occurring in reality, but not
covered in the model presented above. For example, an army can deploy more force elements
changing the number ratio of force elements in the middle of a combat. We kept the model
simple intentionally. Neither are we aiming at a very detailed model showing a realistic behavior
in all aspects nor it is our intention to cover all possible real-life situations, in which kinetic
combat and cyber combat are co-occurring. Instead, the paper points at the presentation of
the fundamentals of an analysis and assessment method customizable to various peculiarities
occurring in practice. If this method should be applied to a real-life situation with a continued
usage of the assessment results in mind, it may be necessary to adapt the model to the current
circumstances for getting results of high quality. The presented analysis concept will be left
untouched by such model modifications at least in principle.
Events Associated Parameter Changes
Initial settings α, δ, γ, γ˜ = 0
Start of kinetic combat at time tkin δ set to (effective) parameter value
Start of malware attack at time tatt = tkin + ∆tatt α set to (effective) parameter value
Stop of malware attack at time tatt + ∆tmal α = 0
Start of patching process at time tpat = tkin + ∆tpat γ, γ˜ set to (effective) parameter values
Table 2: Translation of the events resulting from the timing parameters given in table 1 to
corresponding changes of the parameter settings. The term ’effective parameter value’ means
here the original parameter value, which is restored after switching off the corresponding part of
the model momentarily by setting the parameter equal to zero in the start phase of the simulation.
Proposition 2 (Properties of the Equation System).
a) The equation system (3) is symmetric w.r.t. Blue and Red, i.e. an interchange of the initial
conditions and parameters for Blue and Red corresponds to an interchange of the dynamics
of the compartment levels Sb(t), Ib(t), Rb(t), Db(t) and Sr(t), Ir(t), Rr(t), Dr(t).
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t0 tkin tatt tpat tatt#end tkin#end tend
∆tmal∆tatt
∆T
∆tpat
Figure 3: Designations of events and time intervals as used in the text.
b) The quantity N(t) +D(t) is preserved over time. For an initial condition D(0) = 0, one gets
N(0) = N(t) +D(t) for all times t.
Sketch of Proof.
a) According to the structure of (3)
b) Summing up N ′(t) +D′(t) = S′(t) + I ′(t) +R′(t) +D′(t) the changes for all compartments
gives 0, because all terms will cancel out. Thus, N(t) +D(t) is constant over time.
2.4 Model Validation and Model Realism
A validation is essential for supporting the claims of representativeness and utility of the model.
Our strategy of model validation is oriented towards internal consistency. This takes into account
that our abstract model of a kinetic combat co-occurring with malware propagation does not
aim primarily at a detailed and precise representation of a real world situation, but at enabling
a discussion of the fundamental phenomena of the interactions between availability of system
capabilities and malware effects. Furthermore, it has to be noted that real word comparison
data are not yet accessible. Accordingly, we validate the kinetic and cyber part of the Lanch-
ester/SIR model (3) by cross-validation with pure Lanchester and SIR models. Concerning the
Lanchester part of the model, we have already referred to [7, 15] regarding the usability of the
Lanchester model as a description of some historic real-life events. Concerning the applicability
of an SIR-model as a description of a malware epidemic and concerning the representation of
malware infection mechanisms, see [25] and the references therein. Since both Lanchester and
SIR models could be judged as realistic to some extent, this establishes the validity of the two
main components of (3) after a successful cross-validation. Concerning the interactions between
the Lanchester and the SIR components, plausibility arguments are used. Some details about
the validation process are presented in the following.
Now, we compare the behavior of the two key components of the model — the kinetic combat
and the malware propagation component — with the behavior of basic models of the pure
Lanchester and SIR equations. In this way, the correct formulation and implementation of
equation system (3) has been checked. Unused parts of (3) were switched off for the validation
by appropriate parameter settings. For comparing the Lanchester part of (3) with the pure
Lanchester model (1), all model parameters are set to zero resp. neutral values with exception of
δb, δr, p, q. For the effectiveness reduction of force elements due to malware infections, we have
chosen ηb, ηr = 1.
For executing a cross-validation of the cyber warfare component, the model parameters are set
to neutral values with exception of β, γ, γ˜. Especially, it holds δb, δr, αb, αr = 0. Furthermore, we
will limit our considerations to Blue due to the symmetry of (3) according to proposition 2.a).
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This leads to the following comparison model.
dSb
dt
=− βbSbIb/Nb − γbSb
dIb
dt
= βbSbIb/Nb − γ˜bIb(Sb +Rb)/Nb
dRb
dt
= γbSb + γ˜bIb(Sb +Rb)/Nb
(5)
This equation system differs from common SIR-models with biological origin by an unusual
’recovery’ term γ˜bIb(Sb + Rb)/Nb. For the cross-validation, we will use the initial conditions
Sb(0) ∈ [0.1, 1.0] and Ib(0) := 0.1 · Sb. Using Ib(0) > 0 is a consequence of the missing option
of a malware attack; thus, we have to start with a non-zero fraction of infections. Applying a
pre-implemented ODE solver for the comparison models validates also the Euler method used
as solution algorithm for (3). The existence of events changing parameter values discontinuously
makes it advantageous to use a simple explicit solution method.
Additionally, the overall model and thus the interactions between the two main components was
examined based on plausibility arguments. This means that the behavior of the model has been
checked against common sense behavior. Besides the plausibility of the effects of parameter
changes and the occurrence of corresponding features in the model dynamics, checks of the
reproducibility of constraints like the conservation of the overall number Nb(t) + Db(t) resp.
Nr(t) +Dr(t) of force elements or the monotonic decrease of existing force elements Nb(t) resp.
Nr(t) over time were executed.
Accordingly we can state, that the model (3) includes important aspects of the behavior of force
elements affected by malware epidemics and that it represents various real-life situations of a
combined kinetic-cyber combat at least approximately. Due to the simplicity of the model, not
all aspects of practical relevance are covered, of course. We may not be able to describe all
real-life situations with sufficient accuracy using (3).
3 Simulation Runs
3.1 Design and Outcome Space
The model (3) is more general than the models used by Schramm [25] and Yildiz [32]. In this
way, real-life situations could be better matched and additional scenarios examined. The higher
generality makes the analysis of the model more difficult in turn. Analytic discussions of the
model properties become partially tedious or unfeasible at all. In order to analyze the behavior
of the system (3), simulation experiments are executed for specific scenarios x ∈ X instead.
Realizing a simulation-based approach follows the ideas developed in [5, 6]. The space X of
scenarios is the Cartesian product of the domains of the input parameters and of the initial
conditions. The set X is also called design space.
A specific scenario x ∈ X provides the input for the simulation. Executing the simulation
sim : X → Y assigns an outcome y ∈ Y to the input x. The space Y = (R+0 → R+0 )8 of
simulation outcomes records the dynamic of the model (3) as the time-dependent variations of
the levels of all eight compartments. Thus, an outcome y ∈ Y has the form(
(Sb(t))t∈T , (Ib(t))t∈T , (Rb(t))t∈T , (Db(t))t∈T , (Sr(t))t∈T , (Ir(t))t∈T , (Rr(t))t∈T , (Dr(t))t∈T
)
with T = [0,∞[ as the domain of the simulation time.
3.2 From Trajectories to Scalar Observables
The components of the outcome space Y consist of time-dependent trajectories of infinite length.
For such function spaces usually no canonical ordering ’<’ exists, which is a serious obstacle for
comparing scenario outcomes. Without a canonical ordering relation, it is hard to justify why an
outcome y is considered as better than an outcome y′. An option of reducing the time-dependent
trajectories to single scalar values would be helpful in this respect. The following proposition
improves the situation.
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Proposition 3 (Dynamics at Infinity). For t→∞, one gets S′(t), I ′(t), R′(t), D′(t)→ 0
Sketch of Proof. In the following, we assume w.l.o.g. that all events have already been processed,
i.e. that no model parameters will change anymore in the simulation run. Since the compartment
S has no inflow, the level of S is monotonically decreasing. According to S′′ < 0 — derivable
directly from (3) — the decrease of S′(t) is monotonic as well; thus, an already small flow rate
can not increase again. Due to the monotonic decrease of S(t) and S′(t) on the one hand and
the limitation given by S(t) ≥ 0 on the other, the decrease must be fading out. We can state
∀ε > 0 ∃t′ ≥ 0 ∀t > t′ : |S′(t)| < ε. This proves the claim S′ → 0. Concerning the claim D′ → 0,
an analogous reasoning can be made. Here, the compartment D has no outflow leading to a
monotonic decrease of D(t) and D′(t). The claim holds, because D(t) is limited from above
according to D(t) ≤ S(0) = N(0) because of proposition 2.b).
The statement S′ → 0 means according to the flows shown in figure 1 that for t > t′, there is no
significant inflow to the compartment I anymore. From this time on, the compartment level of
I will change significantly only due to an eventual outflow. We can argue again analogous to S′
and D′ and state that I(t) and I ′(t) is monotonically decreasing. Consequently, ∀ε > 0 ∃t′′ >
t′ ∀t > t′′ : |I ′(t)| < ε. This proves I ′ → 0 as well. Finally, we make use of the preservation of
N(t) +D(t) = S(t) + I(t) +R(t) +D(t) over time according to proposition 2.b). Since we have
already shown S′, I ′, D′ → 0, we get R′ → 0 as well.
Proposition 3 means that the dynamic of (3) is fading out for t→∞. In effect, the proposition
thus justifies the interpretation of the values C¯ := limt→∞ C(t), C ∈ {Sb, Ib, Rb, Db, Sr, Ir, Rr, Dr, }
of the compartment levels at infinity as ’result’ of the simulation. Due to C¯ ∈ R, a canonical
total ordering ’<’ is available for assessment purposes then. Additionally, a fading dynamics is
established as a plausible stop criterion of the simulation, because the state of the system at
this time is approximately equal to its state at infinity. Accordingly, the stop is triggered if all
compartments C ∈ {Sb, Ib, Rb, Db, Sr, Ir, Rr, Dr, } fulfill the criterion
|C(t)− C(t+ ∆τ)| < ε (6)
for a ’long’ time period ∆τ . The end time of the simulation given by the stopping criterion
is designated as tend. Since special events like a malware attack may change the considered
situation in a fundamental way, we have to assure that no such event has still to be processed
when the outcome of a simulation run is assessed. Thus, we start to check criterion (6) only
for t > tkin, t > tatt + ∆tmal, and t > tpat simultaneously. This approach works only, if ∆τ is
chosen sufficiently large and ε sufficiently small. Unfortunately, for each choice of ∆τ and of ε
there exist scenarios with an arbitrary slow dynamics leading to large approximation errors. In
such cases an early stop of the simulation provides intermediate instead of ’final’ results. These
exceptions are considered as tolerable, however, since our intention is a statistics-based analysis
of the model behavior as explained later in section 4.1.
A weaker analogon to proposition 3 can be used for defining the end time tkin#end of kinetic
combat. We can state that an almost vanished force will not change its own size significantly
anymore and will also be unable to change the size of the opposing force significantly because of
its almost vanished fighting power.
Proposition 4 (Effects of a Destroyed Force). If Nr → 0 or if Nb → 0, then N ′b, N ′r, D′b, D′r → 0.
Proof. W.l.o.g one can assume Nb → 0; otherwise change blue and red side. Since Nb + Db
is preserved over time according to proposition 2.b), and since Nb will not significantly change
anymore, Db will not change significantly either. We can thus state N ′b, D
′
b,→ 0. The claim
Nb → 0⇒ N ′r → 0 holds according to proposition 1.c). Proposition 2.b) states that Nr(t)+Dr(t)
is constant over time; thus, N ′r → 0 gives D′r → 0 as well.
In accordance with proposition 4, we define the end time tkin#end of kinetic combat based on the
criterion Nr(t) < ε∨Nb(t) < ε. Of course, tkin#end and tend will not necessarily coincide, because
even after annihilation of one force a malware epidemics may still be underway in the other. The
application of the two criteria for triggering the stop of the simulation and for detecting the end
of kinetic combat leads to the simulation algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1 Simulation Algorithm
1: procedure Simulation
2: loop
3: Calculate system state for new time step t
4: exit if ∀C ∈ {Sb, Ib, Rb, Db, Sr, Ir, Rr, Dr} : |C(t)− C(t+ ∆τ)| < ε
5: tkin#end ← first t with Nr(t) < ε ∨Nb(t) < ε . End time of kinetic combat
6: t← t+ δt . Transition to next Euler step
7: end loop
8: tend ← t . End time of simulation
9: end procedure
3.3 Space of Observables
In the following, the assessment measures — called observables — are defined. Since we aim
at measuring the effects of a malware infection, the numbers of, say, infected or patched force
elements are of minor interest only. Instead we are focusing on the eventually reduced availability
of infected force elements. Accordingly, the remaining survivors Nb, Nr and cumulated losses
Db, Dr counted at the end t = tend of the simulation are of primary interest. Force elements
infected with malware may alter the course of kinetic combat due to their reduced effectiveness.
Since Nb(t), Nr(t) are non-negative, the relative number ∆N := Nb(tend)−Nr(tend) of surviving
force elements seems to be a suitable assessment criterion. Correspondingly, the relative number
∆D := Db(tend) − Dr(tend) of destroyed elements can be applied. The interpretation of these
relative assessment criteria is straightforward. The case ∆N > 0 indicates a win of Blue, whereas
the case ∆N < 0 indicates a win of Red. A situation with ∆N = 0 could be judged as Remis.
Analogously, ∆D > 0 indicates an advantage for Red, whereas ∆D < 0 indicates an advantage
for Blue. Again, ∆D = 0 could be judged as Remis because the losses of both sides have the same
amount. The inclusion of both ∆N and ∆D is justified, because results with e.g. ∆N > 0 and
∆D > 0 are possible due to different force sizes and force effectivenesses. The set of observables
is completed with the duration ∆T := tkin#end − tkin of kinetic combat and with the absolute
number Lb := Db(tend) of losses for the blue force. The observables used in this paper are listed
in table 3. Hereafter, the set of values of an observable, say, ∆N , for a set X˜ ⊆ X of scenarios
is designated as ∆N(X˜). Analogously, the set of values of an input parameter, say, αb occurring
in X˜ is designated as αb(X˜).
Observables Description Codomain Range
∆N := Nb(tend)−Nr(tend) Relative number of existing
force elements at tend
∆N ∈ R ∆N ∈ [−1, 1]
∆D := Db(tend)−Dr(tend) Relative number of destroyed
elements at tend
∆D ∈ R ∆D ∈ [−1, 1]
Lb := Db(tend) Destroyed elements of the blue
force at tend
Lb ∈ R+0 Lb ∈ [0, 1]
∆T := tkin#end − tkin Time span of kinetic combat ∆T ∈ R+0 ∆T ∈ R+0
Table 3: List of the observables used for assessment purposes. In the column ’Range’ the set of
possible outcomes for the initial values and parameter values taken into account in this paper is
given.
Important properties of the observables are given in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 (Extrema of Observables).
a) Let the values of Sb(0), Sr(0) be given and may hold Ib(0), Rb(0), Db(0), Ir(0), Rr(0),
Dr(0) = 0. Then max(∆N) = max(∆D) = Nb(0) and min(∆N) = min(∆D) = −Nr(0).
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b) Let the values of Sb(0), Sr(0) be given and may hold Ib(0), Rb(0), Db(0), Ir(0), Rr(0),
Dr(0) = 0. Then max(Lb) = Nb(0) and min(Lb) = 0.
Sketch of Proof.
a) Due to the definition of ∆N and the monotonic decrease of Nb, the observable ∆N can
not have a value larger than Nb(0). It reaches this value at the end of the simulation,
if all force elements of Blue survive e.g. due to δr = 0 and no elements of Red survive
due to δb > 0 and e.g. ηb = 1. Proposition 2.a) leads to min(∆N) = −Nr(0). Then, the
corresponding statements for ∆D are a consequence of the preservation of both Nb(t)+Db(t)
and Nr(t) +Dr(t) over time according to proposition 2.b).
b) Proof analogous to a)
Quantitative assessments enable comparisons of scenario outcomes, but do not allow judging an
outcome as especially ’good’ or ’bad’. Such absolute assessments become possible, however, as
soon as the range of possible values of the assessment measure is known. Proposition 5 gives the
ranges of ∆N , ∆D, and Lb. One has to keep in mind, however, that constraints defined on the
design space restrict these ranges of possible values as well.
4 Statistics of Simulation Outcomes
4.1 From Knowledge to Probabilities
Since the details of a future (or current) malware attack are unknown, it is advisable to consider
the whole spectrum X of possible scenarios instead of concentrating on a few manually selected
scenarios. In this way, a selection bias is avoided. Unfortunately, a brute-force processing of
the complete scenario space X will be almost impossible in practice due to its usually very
large (and often even infinite) size. This promotes the random selection and analysis of a small
representative subset X˜ ⊂fin X of scenarios. The restriction of X to a small finite subset X˜
is a necessary step for assuring computational tractability; in this respect, it is a counterpart
to the restriction of the simulation runs to finite runtime. It assures a feasible computational
approximation of non-computable exact values. In the following, the subset X˜ is called the
simulation design. The set of outcomes of the simulation scenarios x ∈ X˜ is designated as
Y˜ ⊆ Y .
In order to enable the intended random selection, the set X is enriched by a notion of probability.
This gives the so-called Monte-Carlo design space (X,Prob). The representativeness of the set
X˜ of selected scenarios can be assured, if an ’appropriate’ probability distribution Prob is used.
In this way it is granted, that the analysis results derived for X˜ are also approximately valid
for the complete scenario space X. Thus, the choice of Prob is a crucial issue for our approach.
Various aspects have to be taken into account. Not all scenarios x ∈ X may be considered as
equally important. Knowledge — including observations and assumptions — about the skills of
the involved forces may lead to the expectation that different scenarios x ∈ X will occur with
different frequencies. The probability distribution Prob encodes the available knowledge about
these frequencies of occurrence — or, seen from a different point of view, the incompleteness
and the imperfections of the knowledge as well as the unknowns. In this way, the probability
distribution Prob is a representation of both knowledge and uncertainties about the considered
situation.
The encoding of available knowledge to a corresponding probability distribution Prob follows
information-theoretic principles. We have to avoid that Prob contains more information about
the situation than actually given; consequently, we choose the probability distribution Prob with
the highest entropy among all distributions fulfilling the constraints for the given situation.
According to [11], the entropy H(Prob) of a continuous probability distribution Prob is given by
H(Prob) = − ∫ Prob(x) logProb(x)dx. Thus, we have to maximize the entropy H(Prob) of Prob
under the constraint that Prob is compatible with the existing knowledge.
The inclusion of the knowledge resp. uncertainty perspective gives the following picture. Input
parameters of the model subject to uncertainties may vary, taking on different values. They
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do not need to have fixed values. Their variation is done, though, according to the probabil-
ity distribution Prob of the scenario space (X,Prob) which describes the uncertainties and is
specifically chosen for the given situation. Thus we can state, that in the presented approach
fixed parameter values may be replaced by fixed probability distributions characterizing their
variations. The accompanying transition from a point estimate to a statistics of estimates gives
a richer description of the model behavior. The simulation design resulting from the random
selection of X˜ ⊂fin X is constructed by the execution of corresponding random experiments.
Though a random selection of the scenarios avoids a selection bias successfully, it may introduce
a possible statistical bias. For monitoring the statistical quality of the chosen subset X˜, we
compare the properties of the set X˜, which is generated by computational means, with the
corresponding exact properties of the full design (X,Prob). The exact properties can be derived
analytically. The outcomes Y˜ can be used for monitoring purposes as well. Concerning the
inputs x ∈ X˜ one may check for example, how far the statistics of X˜ reflects the properties of the
probability distribution Prob. Concerning the outcomes, the observed maximum and minimum
of the observables ∆N and ∆D over the set X˜ of scenarios can be compared with the theoretical
range of these observables predicted in proposition 5.a). This helps to supervise the realized
coverage of X by X˜. Another monitoring option for probability distributions Prob, which are
symmetric w.r.t. both sides Blue and Red, is to check the validity of mean(∆N) ≈ 0 and
mean(∆D) ≈ 0 according to the law of large numbers. Here and in the following, the operator
mean designates the statistical mean.
4.2 Risk as Stochastic Evaluation Measure
The statistical mean of an observable is intimately related to the von Neumann-Morgenstern
theory of expected utility [22]. Restricting the considerations to disadvantageous aspects leads
to the notion of risk R instead to the expected utility. Formally, R is defined as the expectation
value of a loss function L [1]. In our case, we naturally consider the observable L = D(tend) of
destroyed force elements as loss value assigned to a single simulation run. The frequencies of
the various loss values are provided by the probability distribution Prob of the underlying Monte
Carlo design space (X,Prob). Accordingly, the risk R can be measured as the average of L(X˜).
In the following proposition, some properties of risk are derived. These properties include a
statement for the special case of a uniform probability distribution Prob. This statement is
made with the example in section 5 in mind, which discusses a specific situation based on the
assumption of a uniform probability distribution Prob for the input parameter variation.
Proposition 6 (Properties of Risk). Let N˜ be the set of values of the initial number N(0) of
force elements in the simulation design X˜.
a) For the simulation design X˜ it holds mean(N(0)) = mean(N(tend)) + mean(D(tend)) =
mean(N(tend)) +R
b) R ≤ (max(N˜)+min(N˜))/2 for a uniform probability distribution Prob of N˜ in the simulation
design X˜.
c) R ≤ max(N˜).
Proof.
a) According to proposition 2.b), one gets N(0) = N(tend) + D(tend). Applying the operator
mean to both sides of the equation and taking the linearity ofmean into account, the definition
of R gives the claimed statement.
b) The risk is maximal, if the losses L are maximal, i.e. if no survivors occur. Thus, it holds
mean(N(tend)) = 0 in this case. Furthermore, for a uniform probability distribution with
upper and lower bounds max(N˜), min(N˜) it holds mean(N(0)) =
(
max(N˜) + min(N˜)
)
/2.
The assertion is an immediate consequence.
c) In the statement mean(N(0)) = mean(N(tend)) + R of part a), the risk R is maximal, if
N(tend) is minimal and N(0) maximal. For an arbitrary simulation design X˜, there may
never be a survivor at the end, and the initial number N(0) of force elements may always
be maximal indeed. Formally, this leads to N(tend) = 0 and N(0) = max(N˜). This gives the
claim.
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Of course, it is possible to define a chance C = mean(N(tend)) analogously to the risk R =
mean(D(tend)). Due to proposition 6.a), C can then be calculated by C = mean(N(0))−R. Since
this gives no new essential information, we will discuss only the risk in the following.
4.3 Scenario Classes
The proposed simulation-based approach of risk assessment is a formal and thus objective
method. This makes the risk assessments of different situations comparable with each other.
We utilize the comparability by introducing so-called scenario classes, which define subsets of
the overall universe of possible situations. These subsets are characterized by sets of constraints,
which restrict the universe of possible situations to the scenario class under consideration. The
constraints represent additional knowledge associated with the corresponding scenario class.
The transition from the general situation to a specific scenario class means a restriction to a
subset, which changes the statistics of situation outcomes in a fundamental way. Usually, this
change can not be derived from the general case. Accordingly, the comparison of the statistics of
the simulation outcomes belonging to different scenario classes gives valuable information about
the model behavior. It enables us to analyze the effects of the constraints characterizing the
scenario classes.
Cyber Part We define the scenario classes listed in table 4, which also gives the characterizing
parameter settings for each scenario class. Except of the kinetic equality case ’kin’, the parameter
settings encode the availability or unavailability of capabilities for malware attack and patching.
Accordingly, the parameter settings associated with a scenario class are not just a numerical
distinction but provide a logical classification as well. If considered as suitable, one may define
additional or changed scenario classes; the basic analysis approach is left untouched by such a
modification.
The scenario classes are grouped in symmetric cases (both sides have the same capabilities; in the
scenario class ’gen’ describing the general situation, for example, all capabilities are available) and
asymmetric cases (some capabilities belong to one side only). Kinetic equality is a special kind of
symmetry. The focus on the availability or unavailability of capabilities for malware attack and
patching is natural, because in an adversarial setting these capabilities influence the outcome
in a fundamental way. Since the model (3) is symmetric, an eventual asymmetry is indeed
caused by missing capabilities in the given scenario classes. Asymmetric cases are mainly used
for discussing the advantages resulting from malware attack and defense capabilities. Though
asymmetric cyber capabilities are more interesting for assessing the potential influence of these
capabilities on the outcome, the symmetric cases ’kin’ and ’pat’ as well as the general situation
’gen’ defined in table 4 provide reference points for comparisons. For the scenario class ’kin’,
the equation system (3) is reduced to the pure Lanchester case described by (1) (for additional
information about this case, see e.g. [29,30]). For ’pat’, the characteristics introduced by setting
both γ, γ˜ to zero are more subtle. As stated before, force elements infected with malware typically
have a reduced kinetic effectiveness representing the impact of the malware infection on the
capabilities of the affected force elements. The setting γ˜ = 0 represents the inability to patch
an infected element for reestablishing the original fighting strength, i.e. these elements can not
recover effectively. This means that the outflow of the compartment I is blocked. In phases
without kinetic combat, the level of the compartment I will thus increase monotonically. As a
supplement, the condition γ = 0 blocks the bypass of I through a direct flow from S to R. This
increases the inflow to I indirectly, i.e. it increases the number of infected force elements and
thus decreases the fighting capability further. It will thus be advantageous for the opposite force
in this case to start the malware attack at the earliest possible time and in the strongest way
possible. The earlier and the more intense the malware attack, the higher the level of infections
and the higher the chances of a successful kinetic combat for the attacker.
Kinetic Part For allowing a concise assessment of the consequences of malware attacks, we
supplement kinetic equality by the notions of kinetic inferiority and kinetic superiority. This
will allow us to quantify the influence of a malware epidemic by e.g. measuring the fraction
of situations, in which cyber warfare gives an advantage despite of losing a pure kinetic battle.
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Id Parameter
Settings
Designation Description
Symmetric Cases
gen - General case No additional constraints
kin ηb, ηr = 1 Pure Lanchester
case
Pure kinetic combat without cyber component
at all
pat γb, γr, γ˜b, γ˜r = 0 No-defense case Neither side is capable of patching
Asymmetric Cases
b-a ηb = 1 One-sided attack
case
The blue side is not affected by malware, i.e.
Red is fighting only at the kinetic level
b-p γr, γ˜r = 0 One-sided
defense case
The red side can not patch contrary to Blue
Kinetic Equality Case
equ Nb(0) = Nr(0),
δb = δr, p = q
Equality case Both sides are kinetically equal due to equality
in force sizes, kinetic effectiveness, and Lanch-
ester coefficients p, q
Table 4: List of scenario classes specifically discussed in the analysis.
The three notions of kinetic equality, kinetic inferiority, and kinetic superiority do not cover the
design space X completely. This can be seen immediately by comparing the conditions, which
characterize kinetic inferiority and kinetic superiority in the definition below, and the notion of
kinetic equality given in table 4. The notions of kinetic inferiority and kinetic superiority are
uncommon, because they are characterized by properties of the outcome and not by constraints
posed on the model parameters.
Definition (Kinetic Superiority and Kinetic Inferiority). Let gkin : X → X;x 7→ x′ designate a
mapping between scenarios, which changes the values of the parameters ηb, ηr to ηb := 1, ηr := 1
and which leaves all other input parameter settings and initial conditions of x unchanged. The
mapping gkin provides a pure kinetic scenario x′ resulting from x by hiding all malware effects,
in which Blue is designated as kinetic superior resp. kinetic inferior, if ∆N(gkin) > 0 resp. < 0.
Kinetic superiority and inferiority make an individual handling advisable, because malware is
used with fundamentally different intentions. In the case of superiority, malware serves pur-
poses of risk reduction. In the case of inferiority, malware intends to change the winning side
by compensating inferiority. This means formally, that Blue aims at ∆N(x) > 0 despite of
∆N(gkin(x)) < 0 for a given scenario x ∈ X. Below, we will take a closer look at such changes
due to modifications of the given scenario.
4.4 Scenario Class Changes
The scenario classes in table 4 are characterized by constraints on the parameter ranges, which
are considered as being a part of the knowledge about the situation. Now we extend our consid-
erations to changes of the actual situation. More precisely, we look at improvements of the state
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of knowledge defining the scenario class and the effects of these improvements on the statistics
of the observables. As already mentioned, we restrict ourselves here to such modifications of the
state of knowledge, which leads to modified ranges of parameter domains. Aim is the assessment
of the influence of scenario class modifications and thus modifications of the design space X on
the outcomes.
For realizing this approach, we have to compare a general scenario x ∈ X with the reference
scenario x′ ∈ X ′ ⊆ X. The corresponding modification of the input x is realized by applying a
transformation mapping g : X → X ′ ⊆ X. The resulting change of the outcome of the simulation
is determined by calculating the difference of the value of an observable o like ∆N . Thus, we
execute a comparison of two scenarios x, x′ related to each other by x′ = g(x) via a relative
assessment measure do(x, g(x)) := o(x)− o(g(x)). This can be diagramed as follows.
x o(x)
do(x, g(x)) := o(x)− o(g(x))
g(x) o(g(x))
g
sim
sim
general case
reference case
comparison
The measure do isolates the effects resulting from the application of the transformation g between
general scenario x and reference scenario x′ = g(x), while it abstracts from other properties
common to x, x′. Both general and reference case belong to the scenario classes presented in
table 4. The comparisons utilized in our analysis are listed in table 5.
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Id General
Case
Reference
Case
Description
Malware Attack
A1 ’gen’ ’kin’ General case vs. pure kinetic combat
A2 ’gen’ ’b-a’ General case vs. one-sided malware attack (Red equalizes
the cyber capability of Blue; equivalently, Blue loses perfect
immunity against cyber attacks)
A3 ’b-a’ ’kin’ One-sided malware attack vs. pure kinetic combat (Addi-
tional one-sided cyber capability for Blue; equivalently, Red
loses perfect immunity against cyber attacks contrary to Blue)
Malware Defense
D1 ’gen’ ’pat’ General case vs. combined kinetic/cyber combat without
countermeasures
D2 ’gen’ ’b-p’ General case vs. one-sided malware defense (Red makes coun-
termeasures available equalizing corresponding capabilities of
Blue)
D3 ’b-p’ ’pat’ One-sided malware defense vs. combined kinetic/cyber com-
bat without countermeasures (Blue gains one-sided capability
of applying countermeasures)
Table 5: List of generic comparisons between two situations (designated as the general and
the reference case), whereby general and reference case belong to the scenario classes presented
in table 4. We distinguish comparisons related to malware attack capabilities and to malware
defense capabilities related to the patching process.
5 Example
For demonstrating how our approach of computational analysis is applied in practice, we consider
an example with specifically chosen parameter values resp. probability distributions describing
the uncertainties. Moreover, the example shows how conclusions beyond the calculation of the
numerical values of the observables can be drawn. The derivation of some interesting patterns
in the example shows the validity of the proposed analysis method. We will give just some
highlights of the results and omit detailed conclusions, because an example always considers a
special situations due to the specifically chosen parameter values or probability distributions.
Thus, the results of the analysis are specific as well and usually not transferable to the general
situation. The existence of phenomena found in the example could be considered as generic for
the overall situation of a combined kinetic-cyber warfare, however.
5.1 Knowledge about the Situation
The example is kept simple intentionally. We limit ourselves to range restrictions of the pa-
rameters contained in X as knowledge about the situation. This gives a uniform probability
distribution Prob [2] as description of the remaining uncertainties of the input parameters. Re-
nouncing any knowledge would be a problem, because in this case the finiteness of the entropy
H(Prob) can not be assured anymore (see section ??). Concerning the initial conditions, we
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assume I(0) = 0, R(0) = 0, D(0) = 0. For the ranges of model parameters and the initial number
of vulnerable elements it may hold (up to restrictions to more specific scenario classes) specifically:
α ∈ [0, 1] β ∈ [0, 5]
γ ∈ [0, 1] γ˜ ∈ [0, 1]
δ ∈ [0, 5] η ∈ [0, 1]
p ∈ [0, 3] q ∈ [0, 3]
∆tatt ∈ [−2, 4] ∆tmal ∈ [0, 1]
∆tpat ∈ [−2, 4] S(0) ∈ [0.1, 1]
The parameters η and γ have a finite domain of admissable values by definition (see table 1).
Their domains are left untouched. The ranges of parameters with originally infinite domain
are restricted by providing a lower and upper limit, however. These restrictions were made
subjectively, but are very well chosen with the intention to cover important and interesting
parameter regions. Among other things, it was taken care that specific parameter values required
in the definition of the scenario classes belong to the parameter ranges. Thus, malware attacks
and patching actions can be carried out or not and malware propagation may happen in both
forces Blue and Red. The parameter ranges chosen for our example respect the symmetry of the
model. For the two forces, the same ranges are made available for parameters corresponding to
each other.
7150 Monte-Carlo simulation runs were executed for each scenario class defined in table 4. We
used a fixed step size of δt = 0.05. A simulation run was stopped as soon as the change of the
value was smaller than 3.0 · 10−4 for each compartment for at least b1/δtc simulation steps. For
monitoring the quality of the statistics, some properties of the statistics of randomly selected
input parameter values and of the simulation outcomes were compared with the theoretically
expected exact properties. In the case of the uniform probability distributions, which are used
for describing the uncertainties of the input parameters, the measured values mean(X˜i) and σ(X˜i)
of the components X˜i of X˜ = (X˜i)i have to be compared with the theoretically expected values
mean(X) = (min(Xi) + max(Xi))/2 and σ(X) = (max(Xi)−min(Xi))/
√
12 of the components
Xi of X = (Xi)i. Numerical results of such comparisons are shown in figure 4.
5.2 Analysis of Scenario Classes
We analyze the statistics of outcomes for the scenario classes. The numerical results can be
found in the appendix in the tables 6 and 7 for the general case and the case of kinetical equality
and in tables 8 and 9 for kinetical inferiority/superiority.
Figure 5 provides a graphical representation of the mean values of observables in the scenario
classes. For kinetic superiority resp. inferiority, it can be seen that mean(∆N) deviates signifi-
cantly from classes without kinetic imbalance as expected. The influence of kinetical superiority
resp. inferiority on mean(∆D) is slightly smaller than on mean(∆N). The risk R representing
the mean absolute number of losses is typically less influenced by superiority or inferiority than
the mean relative number mean(∆D) of losses. Kinetical equality increases the risk R both for
malware attack and defense situations to a level comparable to situations with kinetic inferiority.
Contrary to kinetic inferiority, the higher risk for situations with kinetic equality is accompanied
by a prolongation of the phases of kinetic combat as indicated by mean(∆T ).
Concerning the detailed behavior of ∆N , the value distributions in figure 10 in the appendix
are a good starting point. Complementary information about one-sided attack and defense are
given in figure 12. In figure 11 in the appendix, histograms are shown for the general case and
the subclasses of kinetically superior and inferior forces. Value distributions for the losses L can
be found in the figures 11 and 12.
The influence of the variation of some input parameters on the relative number ∆N of survivors
is shown exemplary in figure 6. The figure also shows the sometimes minor importance of the
duration ∆tmal of a malware attack. This supports the view that an effective malware attack
does not necessarily need to last long.
As a final remark, we want to add that attacks together with patching (scenario classes ’gen’
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Figure 4: Exemplary behavior of the statistical bias dependent on the number of simulation
runs. Measuring statistical quantities of the simulation design X˜ and the associated outcomes
Y˜ and comparing them with theoretical predictions for the corresponding ideal designs allow an
assessment of the quality of the selection X˜ of scenarios. If the quality turns out to be insufficient,
the size of the simulation design has to be increased accordingly. The exemplary behavior of
relevant quantities defined on the input space X is shown on the left, whereas relevant quantities
for the outcome space Y are shown on the right. All these quantities will have the value zero on
X resp Y for a uniform probability distribution Prob.
Let us designate the domain of γb as dom(γb). Concerning the input, the plot includes the
difference between the measured mean mean(γb(X˜)) and the expected value (min(dom(γb)) +
max(dom(γb)))/2 of the vulnerability patching rate γb of Blue, the difference between min(γb(X˜))
resp. max(γb(X˜)) and min(dom(γb)) resp. max(dom(γb)), and the value of mean(γb(X˜)) −
mean(X˜γr ). Concerning the outcome, the plot includes mean(∆N(X˜)) and the difference between
the measured value max(∆N(X˜)) resp. min(∆N(X˜)) and the expected maximum 1.0 resp.
minimum −1.0 according to proposition 5.a).
and ’b-a’) on the one hand and situations without patching capability (scenario classes ’pat’ and
’b-p’) on the other turn out to be similar very often. One reason for this similarity may be that
without malware attacks, there are also no patching actions (If there is no action, counteractions
do not make sense).
5.3 Analysis of Scenario Class Changes
In the previous section 5.2, the statistics of the observables defined in table 3 is given for various
scenario classes. Now we supplement these consideration by an analysis of the statistical effects
of scenario class changes. For this analysis, we have used the same simulation runs as described
in section 5.2. The numerical results of the analysis are represented in the tables 10 - 13 in the
appendix.
We begin the analysis with a discussion of the influence of kinetic superiority or inferiority on the
changes of the outcomes. Corresponding histograms of the behavior ofmean(d∆N ) andmean(dLb)
are given in figure 8. For the transformation classes A2 and A3, adding cyber capabilities will
increase the number of survivors especially for situations with kinetic inferiority. The effect for
situations with kinetic superiority is significantly smaller. For the general case and kinetically
equal forces, no significant effect can be observed for the cases A1 and D1 concerning mean(d∆N )
or mean(d∆D). From the viewpoint of the absolute number Lb of losses, the situation is different.
The value of |dLb | is significantly larger for kinetically equal forces than for the general case.
Figure 11 considers the value distributions of ∆N and of Lb for kinetic superiority or inferiority
without distinguishing different levels.
Concerning the behavior in the case of kinetic superiority resp. inferiority, figure 7 provides
some supplementary information. An additional cyber capability for Blue (case A3) increases
the losses especially for kinetically equal forces. For kinetic superiority resp. inferiority, the
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Figure 5: The bar charts give the mean values of the observables ∆N , ∆D, ∆T , and the risk
R = mean(Db(tend)) for various scenario classes. The classes are organized in eight groups. The
first four groups display the results for situations with and without kinetic equality constraint for
both cyber attack and cyber defense situations. The last four groups repeat these considerations
for the cases of kinetic superiority and inferiority. Each group consists of the case without
further constraints, the one-sided cyber capability case and the case without corresponding cyber
capabilities.
In all symmetric cases, mean(∆N) ≈ 0 and mean(∆D) ≈ 0 due to the symmetry of both the
model (3) and the chosen space X of scenarios. Accordingly, fighting out a combat for both sides
not only at the kinetic but on the cyber level as well does not influence the chances of survival
in the mean. If only the blue side supports its kinetic combat with a malware attack, mean(∆N)
is increased and mean(∆D) decreased. If only patching capabilities are limited to Blue (defense
case), mean(∆N) is only slightly increased. The value of mean(∆D) is decreased accordingly.
On average, the expected number of surviving force elements is considerably smaller than the
expected number of destroyed force elements; this holds due to the fact that the loosing side
of a kinetic combat has no surviving force elements, whereas even the force of the winning side
is reduced by a certain amount of elements destroyed in combat. Correspondingly, the value
distribution of ∆D is typically less pronounced than ∆N . The risk is reduced in the case of
one-sided malware attacks or defenses.
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Legend:
Variation of ∆tatt,b Variation of ∆tmal,b
Variation of ∆tpat,b Variation of αb
Variation of βr Variation of γ˜r
Blue Red Blue Red
α 0.8309833 0.0590945 β 4.011625 0.346817
γ 0.9332377 0.574473 γ˜ 0.6532169 0.07854939
δ 4.184106 0.7642936 η 0.3109801 0.9594556
∆tatt 1.429832 0.2120419 ∆tmal 0.0720614 0.3140299
∆tpat −0.22541 2.894121 N(0) 0.27401 0.2261178
p = 2.143248 q = 1.947652
Figure 6: Relationship between variations of the input and the outcome of the simulation. We
have calculated the dependence of the relative number ∆N (black line) of survivors on the
variations of several input parameters for an example defined by the parameter values given in
the table. The input parameters taken into consideration are (from left to right, from top to
bottom) ∆tatt,b, ∆tmal,b, ∆tpat,b, αb, βr, and γ˜r. The plots indicate the influence of the position
tmax Ir of the malware infection peak and the phase of kinetic combat relative to each other. This
is done by showing the position of the time tmax(Ir) (red line) at which the maximum number
of infected force elements is reached, with start and end time tkinstart, tkinend of kinetic combat (grey
region). As can be seen, the change of input parameters may lead to shifts of the time tmax(Ir).
The relationship is quite often nontrivial. Note that timing of countermeasures of Red has an
influence as well.
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increase is larger resp. smaller than in the general case. Equalizing the red capabilities by
adding a cyber capability to the red force as well (case A2) leads to a different behavior. Here,
the number of losses will increase for Blue especially in the case of kinetic superiority.
Situations, in which the winning side changes due to the usage of malware, are of special interest.
They are considered in more detail in the figures 7, 9, 13. Whereas figure 7 gives mean values
of the changes of the relative number ∆N of survivors and of the absolute number Lb of losses
for transitions between scenario classes, figure 13 in the appendix focuses more detailed on the
influence of malware attacks on the value distributions of surviving and destroyed force elements.
Accordingly, histograms of d∆N and dLb are given for the transformation classes A1, A2, and A3
(see table 5). The data are presented with and without restriction to situations with a change
of the winning side due to cyber combat support. All data indicate, as expected, that malware
can turn around a situation in a significant number of situations. An especially large number of
winning changes are observed for one-sided capabilities (see figures 7 and 9). One effect of the
changes of the winning side is the absolutely large value of the minimum and maximum of d∆N
and d∆D (see tables 10 - 13). This indicates the possibility of a large decrease or increase of the
corresponding observables.
5.4 Duration of Kinetic Combat
Numerical data about the duration ∆T of kinetic combat for different scenario classes are given
in the tables 6 - 9. For all scenario classes, the mean duration mean(∆T ) of kinetic combat is
much smaller than the observed maximum duration max(∆T ). The minimum duration min(∆T )
is consistently close to zero. The comparatively large maxima result from situations with very
slow dynamics caused by small kinetic effectiveness of both sides. In such a case it will take
a long time until one force is annihilated ending the combat. In situations with a still slower
dynamics, the simulation misinterprets the absence of significant changes of the force sizes as
end of kinetic combat (or triggers even a stop of the whole simulation run). Since this may be
done immediately after the start of kinetic combat, one gets min(∆T ) ≈ 0. Another reason for
short-duration combats is a strong superiority or inferiority of one force leading to a victory or
defeat within short time. Such situations indeed exist, as is indicated by the higher risk for
kinetic combat with short duration.
A short duration of the kinetic combat limits the influence of an eventual malware infection.
Due to the short duration, the malware has typically not much time to spread and thus of
being effective in combat (see figure 14 in the appendix). Furthermore, the probability that
the malware infection reaches its peak (and thus its highest effectiveness) in the phase of kinetic
combat is smaller (look at the wandering of the peak of infection due to input parameter variation
in figure 6).
The tables 10 - 13 supplement the considerations about ∆T with information about the behavior
of d∆T . Figure 8 indicates in the case of kinetic equality that the usage of malware leads typically
to a slightly prolonged kinetic combat, often due to reduced kinetic effectiveness of both sides
as demonstrated in figure 8. In the case of kinetic equality, the usage of malware leads typically
to a slightly prolonged kinetic combat, often due to reduced kinetic effectiveness of both sides.
The equalization of the kinetic effectiveness of the two forces is another possible cause. In fact,
the duration ∆T of kinetic combat is the longest for kinetically equal forces. With increasing
degree of inferiority or superiority, the duration of kinetic combat decreases, whereby the duration
decreases stronger in the case of superiority than in the case of inferiority. In figure 14 in the
appendix, the tendency of an equalization of effectiveness by malware usage can be observed as a
shift of the peak in the distribution of losses to higher values especially for short-duration kinetic
combats.
In some situations, however, the additional usage of malware reduces the duration significantly.
In such cases, presumably the malware turns out to be effective for just one side. This will
simultaneously shorten and intensify kinetic combat. Obviously, the effects enabling a faster
decision of combat are stronger then than the prolongation of kinetic combat due to reduced
kinetic effectiveness.
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mean(d∆N)
mean(dLb)
mean(d∆N) for Situations with Change of Winning Side
mean(dLb) for Situations with Change of Winning Side
Figure 7: Mean changes of observables for various types of scenario class changes. The first two
bar charts document the mean values of the changes of the relative number ∆N of survivors
and of the absolute number Lb = Db(tend) of losses for the transitions between scenario classes
defined in table 5. Below, the corresponding values for situations with a change of the winning
side due to the transitions are given. The results are grouped according to the transformation
classes A1, A2, A3, D1, D2, D3; each group covers the case without other constraints, the case
of kinetically equal forces, and the cases of kinetic superiority resp. inferiority.
Let us at first consider the general cases shown in the upper two charts. For A1 and D1,
mean(d∆N ) and mean(dLb) is close to zero, whereas for A2/A3 resp. D2/D3 significant deviations
can be observed. The different behavior is caused by the fact that both A1 and D1 describe
transformations between symmetric cases, whereas A2, A3, D2, and D3 transforms symmetric
to asymmetric cases and vice versa.
The mean values of the measures d∆N , dLb restricted to situations with a change of the winning
side are usually much more pronounced. For kinetically equal forces, this scale up of the values
is smaller than in the other cases, however. No data are given for kinetically equal forces for the
classes A1 and A3, since the original situation has an even outcome per definition. For kinetically
superior (blue) forces in the case A3, which describes the addition of cyber capabilities to Blue,
naturally no change of the winning side can be expected.
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Figure 8: The charts show the dependence of the behavior of the system on the level of kinetic
superiority or inferiority. For this purpose, the set of scenarios was partitioned in 10 classes
depending on the value of ∆N for the associated pure Lanchester scenario. Scenarios with the
strongest inferiority ∆N < −0.8 are shown at the outermost left in the histograms, the scenarios
with the strongest superiority ∆N > 0.8 at the outermost right. In the first row, we show the
mean values of ∆N , ∆T , and Lb for general scenarios assuming symmetric cyber capabilities (i.e.
scenario class ’gen’). Beyond that, the mean changes mean(d∆N ), mean(d∆T ), and mean(dLb)
for the transition classes A1, A2, A3 are given. The variation of ∆N across the inferiority and
superiority classes corresponds to the definition of these classes; the antisymmetry w.r.t. ∆N = 0
is preserved. The additional usage of malware dampening the existing kinetic differences slightly,
however, as is indicated by the behavior of mean(d∆N ) for the class A1.
The losses are substantially smaller for superior forces than for inferior forces. One has to note,
that the highest losses do not occur for extreme inferiority, but for significant inferiority. This
is caused by the fact that typically the initial number of force elements in the class of strongest
inferiority is quite small, thus not leading to high losses. The additional usage of malware
decreases the losses in the case of strong superiority, but will increase it in the case inferiority
or weak superiority. The increase is caused by the overall reduction of kinetic effectiveness of
force elements due to malware infections, which will level out inferiority and superiority to some
degree. As a result, the losses on both sides will increase in many situations.
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Fraction of Situations with Change of Winning Side
Fraction of Situations with Change of Winning Side with ∆T ≥ 50
Figure 9: The bar chart at the top shows the fractions of scenarios x, in which the usage of
malware changes the winning side. The chart at the bottom gives the corresponding values for
the subset of all scenarios x ∈ X˜ with a corresponding pure Lanchester scenario gkin(x) fulfilling
∆T ≥ 50, i.e. with a long phase of kinetic combat (see section 5.4). The results are grouped
according to the transformation classes A1, A2, A3, D1, D2, D3; each group covers the case
without other constraints, the case of kinetically equal forces, and the cases of kinetic superiority
resp. inferiority. No data are given for kinetically equal forces for the classes A1 and A3, since
the considered transition starts with a scenario with an even outcome per definition. Thus, it
does not make sense to speak about a change of the winning side here.
In many cases indeed a turn around of the situation by changing the winning side occurs after
additional usage of malware. Furthermore, in the case of long lasting kinetic battles usually a
slightly higher fraction of turn-around can be observed. This means, malware is more effective
in situations, in which it has more time to influence the outcome. For transition classes D1, D2,
D3, which are related to defense capabilities against malware, the fraction of situations with a
change of the winning side is typically smaller than for the classes A1, A2, and A3 related to the
overall malware usage capability. This is caused by the more radical changes described by the
transition classes A1, A2, A3.
6 Discussion
6.1 Influence of Dynamics
the model (3) is analyzed based on input-outcome relationships. This essentially abstracts from
the model dynamics. For a better understanding of the model behavior, it is helpful to look at
the phenomena of the dynamical evolution of a situation.
Since infected force elements may be subject to a reduction of kinetic effectiveness, a temporal
coincidence of the peak of infection in a force and the phase of kinetic combat is advantageous
for the opposing force. Timing of the cyber attack and parametrization of the malware have to
be set accordingly. Starting the malware attack too early gives the enemy the option of patching
and thus restoring the kinetic effectiveness of many force elements until kinetic combat starts.
A late start time of the malware attack does not yet have a significant influence on the kinetic
combat due to the small number of infections taking place until tkin is reached. Let us consider
some specific examples.
An alignment of the malware infection peak with the phase of kinetic combat can be reached by
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setting the value of the infection rate β appropriately. High infection rates are not always recom-
mendable due to a maybe untimely peak of infections. Similarly, extending the duration ∆tmal
of a malware attack may sometimes have negative consequences as well. For the defending side,
analogous paradoxa exist. Early countermeasures set into effect by choosing an appropriate ∆tpat
may sometimes be disadvantageous. The malware epidemics may be weakened, thus shifting the
epidemics peak to later times. As a consequence, the peak of infections may now be located in
the phase of kinetic combat causing a larger number of losses than before. At the cyber level,
the co-occurring reduction of malware attack capabilities of the defender — only vulnerable and
patched force elements can execute a malware attack, but not infected force elements — retroacts
on the attacker.
6.2 Analysis vs. Computation
The paper discusses the interactions between security and availability based on a model repre-
senting the effects of self-replicating malware propagating across force elements engaged in kinetic
combat. The behavior of the model — especially the influence of malware on kinetic combat —
was analyzed both analytically and computationally. In this way, synergies between analytical
and computational methods could be exploited. The analytical part makes essential contribu-
tions for enabling a computational analysis under well-defined conditions and plays a decisive
role in the interpretation of the results. The computational part, on the other hand, provides
the calculation of the statistics of outcomes, which is done quantitatively based on Monte-Carlo
simulations and can hardly be realized at the analytical level.
6.3 Abstraction Level of Model
The Lanchester/SIR model needs necessarily to abstract some aspects of the battle. We made use
of two paradigms for gaining the necessary abstraction. First, we chose a system dynamics model
(though with some extensions e.g. an event-like structure). Second, we permitted descriptive
modeling aspects like the inclusion of exponents p, q instead of insisting on purely explanatory
models. The abstraction leads to a model, which does not capture the dynamics of a war
accurately in all aspects. The model could thus be criticized as too simple to be of actual value
in practice. For our purposes, a highly abstract model has decisive advantages, though. We
were able to derive important model properties at an analytical level. Furthermore, a simple
model of small computational complexity assures a practical tractability of the large number of
simulation runs, which are required for reaching a sufficiently dense coverage of the design space
X. Based on the experimental results, we were able to gain new insights into the properties
and behavior of a combined kinetic and cyber warfare model. The comparative simplicity of our
Lanchester/SIR model has the advantage that it illustrates especially the fundamental properties
and basic phenomena.
The new insight is perhaps astonishing in view of the many missing details, and thus it is fair to
ask whether a more elaborated model would be also more useful. We want to state, however, that
the model (3) is already more general than similar models published in literature. In this way, we
achieved a suitable realism of the model (see the discussion in sections 2.1 and 2.4). Of course,
a more elaborated model would usually allow also an even better match to a real situation. The
match will usually establish characteristics, though, which may include geographic details like
mountains, seas, or rivers, or singular force elements like aircraft carriers or command and control
units. Accordingly, the results of analysis will become more precise and better usable for practical
purposes, but less generic as well. Substantial details characterize a very specific situation. The
probability for a future situation to coincide with these details becomes infinitesimally small.
Since in this paper we want to focus on the overall analysis approach and not on the analysis of
a specific situation, we decided to use a generic model. For a future application of the proposed
analysis approach to a real-life situation, indeed a refined and more detailed model may be used.
The construction of a more elaborated model must be done thoughtfully. A better elaboration
will usually be accompanied with more details, which in turn will lead to a higher number of
parameters. In real life, it seems hardly feasible to determine the values of all these parameters
accurately. Usually, we are not informed in detail about a situation. It does not seem plausible
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to assume e.g. comprehensive knowledge about an adversarial force. Due to incomplete insight
into intentions and plans of an enemy and due to the so-called ’fog of war’, the amount of
missing knowledge will be significant leading to many uncertainties or even unknowns. Under
such circumstances, the validity of statistically derived statements can only be guaranteed, if a
corresponding number of simulation outcomes can be provided. If too many parameters can vary
at a large scale, the statistical significance of the results become inacceptable small. Then, no
statements about the statistics of outcomes are possible anymore, only a list of possible outcomes
can be delivered. Summing up, a more elaborated model without corresponding knowledge about
the values of the model parameters seems to be questionable. It is not necessarily possible to
make use of the higher degree of elaboration. Additionally, even highly elaborated models may
not reproduce all effects occurring in reality.
6.4 Synergies between Dependability Aspects
We have discussed the interplay between the availability of capabilities of force elements and
a propagating malware infection. Whereas the malware reduces the kinetic effectiveness of a
force impeding its capability to carry out kinetic combat, kinetic capabilities will restrict in turn
both malware attack and patching capabilities of the enemy. Effects of the malware on the
availability can be determined directly by quantifying the outcome of the kinetic combat with
and without usage of malware. The availability perspective, on the other hand, can be used to
give the malware infection a ’meaning’ beyond the rudimentary observation whether an infection
exists or not. In this way our considerations show the strengths of the domain of dependability,
which discusses various secondary2 system properties (availability, reliability, safety, security,
maintainability, . . .) in a combined way. The advantage consists of taking interactions and
trade-offs between the secondary properties into account.
Accordingly, the approach presented in this paper is also related to the unified simulation-based
risk assessment concept for safety and security suggested in [5, 6]. Whereas malware aspects
belong to the domain of security, the notion of availability is related to both safety and secu-
rity. Though appealing from the theoretical point of view, a practical realization of an ’exact’
simulation-based risk assessment is impeded often by the very high computational complexity of
such an algorithm. This complexity results from the simulation of the various options of system
evolutions for determining the contributions of these branches to the overall risk in a brute-force
way. Maybe the principle of a knowledge-based selection of representative scenarios provides a
viable option for the approximation of the precise value of the risk in this more complex context
as well. The idea is to restrict the simulation runs to a limited number of appropriate evolution
branches, whereby the representativeness of the contributions of these branches to the risk has to
be assured by corresponding system properties. Monte-Carlo simulation based risk assessments
are already successfully applied to e.g. the assessment of project risks [19].
7 Outlook
7.1 Our Main Contributions
• Simulation-based calculation of scenario outcomes and their quantitative assessment.
• Inclusion of knowledge and assumptions about the situation by information-theoretic prin-
ciples.
• Inclusion of remaining uncertainties using Monte-Carlo simulations.
• Automated model-based calculation of statistic-based properties like the risk.
• Determination of the changes of the outcomes after an update of the available knowledge.
• Demonstration of synergies resulting from a combined handling of availability and malware
infections.
2The primary system properties are the system functionalities.
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7.2 Future Research
The semi-automatization achieved by the implementation of a model-based computational anal-
ysis process can be used to analyze the differences between various attack methods, infection
mechanisms, propagation pathways, and countermeasures. Furthermore, it enables the experi-
mentation with the consequences of different knowledge (or assumptions) about the situation.
In our paper the considerations are limited to the most simple constraints leading to uniform
probability distributions for the design space. The next step would be to run a maximum-entropy
algorithm for defining probabilities of scenario selection for much more general constraints and
knowledge fragments. Another opportunity for future research is a closer look at the underlying
dynamics. Our experiments demonstrated that the timing of actions and countermeasures may
influence the outcome significantly.
For optimizing the utilization of malware, the peak of the malware infection presumably has
to be aligned with the phase of kinetic combat. Furthermore, the characteristics of malware
propagation and of the force elements have to be adapted to each other. It would be interesting
to discuss the possible improvements by such an optimization of malware utilization.
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Figure 10: Behavior of the relative number ∆N of survivors for different scenario classes. The
figure shows on the left side the value distributions of ∆N in general case, the case with one-sided
usage of malware and the case with one-sided defense, i.e. with one-sided patching and malware
removal capabilities. The right column gives histograms for the situations with kinetic equality
as additional constraint. For the symmetric case, the histogram has a flat peak symmetric w.r.t.
zero according to mean(∆N(X˜)) ≈ 0. The whole possible range of values ∆N(X˜) ⊆ [−1, 1] is
covered. For the cases with one-sided additional capabilities for Blue, the peak of the distribution
of ∆N is shifted toward positive values, i.e. one may expect more survivors for Blue than for
Red.
For scenario classes assuming kinetically equal forces, the variations of the outcomes are much
smaller. For asymmetric capabilities, the peak of the values of ∆N for kinetically equal forces is
closer to the center than for situations without equality constraint. For one-sided cyber attacks
with kinetic equality it holds ∆N ≥ 0.
The behavior of one-sided defense is halfway between the symmetric general case and the situation
of a one-sided malware attack.
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Figure 11: The histograms show the value distributions of ∆N (left column) and Lb = Db(tend)
(right column) for the general case (top row) and for the subclasses of kinetic superiority (middle
row) and of kinetic inferiority (bottom row). Concerning the case of kinetic superiority, the value
distribution of ∆N for ∆N ≥ 0 close to zero is approximately flat with a strong decline towards
large positive values of ∆N . This means, that even in the case of superiority, almost all force
elements will survive only in a few cases. The tail of the distribution for ∆N < 0 indicates, that
the usage of malware by both sides may change the winner in a significant number of cases. For
kinetic inferiority, the situation is similar; situations with a number of blue survivors close to
zero are less frequent however. This difference can be detected in the distribution of losses Lb as
well. On the whole, for kinetic superiority a low number of losses is much more frequent than
many losses. Kinetic inferiority, in turn, shifts the frequency peak of the loss numbers to slightly
higher values.
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Figure 12: Value distributions of ∆N , ∆D, and Lb = Db(tend) given for one-sided cyber attacks
and one-sided cyber defense capabilities. The data are split up for the cases of kinetic superiority
and inferiority of Blue.
In the case of kinetic inferiority, a one-sided cyber attack can very well turn around the situation
as indicated by non-vanishing frequencies for ∆N ≥ 0. The situation of a one-sided defense
essentially resembles the one of one-sided attacks, but is less pronounced. Whereas for kinetic
superiority with or without one-sided cyber attacks a win is assured (i.e. ∆N ≥ 0), one-sided
capabilities of cyber defense will not exclude outcomes with ∆N < 0. This means, the opponent
may be able to turn around the situation.
The relative number ∆D of losses behaves analogously to ∆N , though of course ∆N > 0 is
related to ∆D < 0 and vice versa. Since even a convincing win is usually associated with some
losses, the value distribution of ∆D is typically less pronounced than ∆N . In the case of kinetic
superiority, the opposing force suffers still the majority of losses. For kinetic inferiority, however,
the value distribution of ∆D already becomes roughly symmetric, though a significant shift
towards ∆D > 0 prevails.
The correspondence between ∆N and ∆D can be extended to the distribution of absolute losses
Lb. As already indicated in the text, a small value of losses Lb is much more frequent than many
losses. The observed decline is typically monotonic. In the case of kinetic inferiority, however,
the peak of the frequency is shifted to slightly higher values.
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Figure 14: Dependence of survivors and losses on the duration of kinetic combat. Since the
effectiveness of malware presumably influences the duration of kinetic combat, we take a look at
the value distributions of the relative number of survivors ∆N (left column) and the absolute
number of losses Lb (right column). This is done for short (∆T < 50) and long (∆T ≥ 50)
kinetic combats, whereby the distinction between a short and a long duration is done for both
the corresponding pure Lanchester situation and the combined kinetic/cyber case.
In general, a long duration of kinetic combat leads to a higher frequency of values of ∆N close
to zero, i.e. of situations with an even outcome. For short durations, in the contrary, values of
∆N far away from zero are more prominent. Since for long lasting kinetic combats a low number
of losses is more frequent than a high number, the prevalence of even outcomes must not be
compulsory interpreted as mutual annihilation of both forces. Ineffectiveness of the forces leading
to a stop of simulation due to a faded dynamics is considered as preferable explanation. For short
durations, in the contrary, the peak of losses is shifted towards higher values interpretable as
higher intensity of the kinetic combats than usual.
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Malware Attack
Parameter Unconstrained Forces Kinetically Equal Forces
General One-
Sided
Pure
Kinetic
General One-
Sided
Pure
Kinetic
min ∆N −0.993 −0.993 −0.993 −0.96 ≈ 0 ≈ 0
max ∆N 0.993 0.993 0.982 0.987 0.987 ≈ 0
mean ∆N −0.002 0.08 0.001 −0.004 0.109 0
var ∆N 0.217 0.204 0.202 0.067 0.032 0
min ∆D −0.981 −0.981 −0.981 −0.987 −0− 987 ≈ 0
max ∆D 0.967 0.952 0.962 0.96 0.124 ≈ 0
mean ∆D −0.001 −0.083 −0.004 0.004 −0.109 0
var ∆D 0.134 0.121 0.108 0.067 0.032 0
min ∆T 0 0 0 0 0 0
max ∆T 993.339 993.339 577.697 718.521 537.447 520.573
mean ∆T 61.911 57.491 53.247 82.841 82.335 90.953
var ∆T 6579.745 5715, 387 4791.048 7467.608 6417.927 5850.431
R 0.331 0.293 0.338 0.416 0.38 0.473
Table 6: The table summarizes the behavior of the observables ∆N , ∆D, ∆T as well as the
risk R for the three basic cases of model behavior concerning malware attacks. The three basic
cases are the general system, situations with one-sided malware attacks, and the pure Lanchester
case without any cyber component at all. The summary includes minimum, maximum, statistical
mean, and statistical variance. Additionally, corresponding data for the special case of two forces
of equal size and kinetic effectiveness are given. A short discussion of these data can be found
in section 5.2.
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Malware Defense
Parameter Unconstrained Forces Kinetically Equal Forces
General One-
Sided
No
Defense
General One-
Sided
No
Defense
min ∆N −0.993 −0.99 −0.99 −0.96 −0.96 −0.96
max ∆N 0.993 0.993 0.972 0.987 0.987 0.95
mean ∆N −0.002 0.044 −0.003 −0.004 0.061 −0.002
var ∆N 0.217 0.217 0.222 0.067 0.072 0.08
min ∆D −0.981 −0.981 −0.981 −0.987 −0.987 −0.95
max ∆D 0.967 0.957 0.973 0.96 0.96 0.96
mean ∆D −0.001 −0.047 0 0.004 −0.061 0.002
var ∆D 0.134 0.135 0.138 0.067 0.072 0.08
min ∆T 0 0 0 0 0 0
max ∆T 993.339 653.398 731.777 718.521 660.371 599.111
mean ∆T 61.911 65.139 66.208 82.841 86.916 82.362
var ∆T 6579.745 7255.308 6929.995 7467.608 8854.702 7565.752
R 0.331 0.305 0.323 0.416 0.375 0.397
Table 7: The table summarizes the behavior of the observables ∆N , ∆D, ∆T as well as the
risk R for the three basic cases of model behavior concerning malware defense. The three basic
cases are the general system, situations with one-sided malware recovery, and situations without
recovery for both sides. A short discussion of these data can be found in section 5.2.
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Malware Attack
Parameter Blue as Kinetically Superior Force Blue as Kinetically Inferior Force
General One-
Sided
Pure
Kinetic
General One-
Sided
Pure
Kinetic
min ∆N −0.967 0.001 0 −0.993 −0.993 −0.993
max ∆N 0.993 0.993 0.982 0.893 0.893 0
mean ∆N 0.335 0.429 0.374 −0.348 −0.277 −0.381
var ∆N 0.103 0.061 0.059 0.097 0.099 0.059
min ∆D −0.981 −0.981 −0.981 −0.913 −0.95 −0.69
max ∆D 0.957 0.786 0.807 0.967 0.952 0.962
mean ∆D −0.146 −0.24 −0.185 0.149 0.079 0.183
var ∆D 0.113 0.077 0.075 0.112 0.115 0.074
min ∆T 0 0 0 0 0 0
max ∆T 491.155 519.655 461.574 993.339 993.339 577.697
mean ∆T 61.983 49.946 53.92 61.836 65.241 52.555
var ∆T 6394.049 4657.775 4906.755 6772.351 6684.845 4672.606
R 0.261 0.198 0.251 0.403 0.391 0.428
Table 8: The table summarizes the behavior of the observables ∆N , ∆D, ∆T as well as the risk
R for the three basic cases of model behavior concerning malware attacks. The three basic cases
are the general system, situations with one-sided malware attacks, and the pure Lanchester case
without any cyber component at all. The summary includes minimum, maximum, statistical
mean, and statistical variance. We give corresponding values for Blue as kinetic superior as well
as inferior force. A short discussion of these data can be found in section 5.2.
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Malware Defense
Parameter Blue as Kinetically Superior Force Blue as Kinetically Inferior Force
General One-
Sided
No
Defense
General One-
Sided
No
Defense
min ∆N −0.967 −0.967 −0.967 −0.993 −0.99 −0.99
max ∆N 0.993 0.993 0.972 0.893 0.893 0.867
mean ∆N 0.335 0.375 0.328 −0.348 −0.296 −0.343
var ∆N 0.103 0.096 0.113 0.097 0.114 0.106
min ∆D −0.981 −0.981 −0.981 −0.913 −0.962 −0.962
max ∆D 0.957 0.957 0.958 0.967 0.955 0.973
mean ∆D −0.146 −0.187 −0.139 0.149 0.097 0.144
var ∆D 0.113 0.105 0.12 0.112 0.125 0.116
min ∆T 0 0 0 0 0 0
max ∆T 491.155 510.155 731.777 993.339 653.398 603.747
mean ∆T 61.983 58.622 66.579 61.836 71.832 65.827
var ∆T 6394.049 5872.975 6992.89 6772.351 8588.886 6867.066
R 0.261 0.229 0.257 0.403 0.383 0.391
Table 9: The table summarizes the behavior of the observables ∆N , ∆D, ∆T as well as the
risk R for the three basic cases of model behavior concerning malware defense. The three basic
cases are the general system, situations with one-sided malware recovery, and situations without
recovery for both sides. We give corresponding values for Blue as kinetic superior as well as
inferior force. A short discussion of these data can be found in section 5.2.
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Parameter Unconstrained Forces Kinetically Equal Forces
d∆N d∆D d∆T dLb d∆N d∆D d∆T dLb
Case A1: Malware attack for both sides omitted
min −1.27 −1.519 −560.165 −0.921 −0.96 −0.987 −503.17 −0.93
max 1.519 1.27 905.4 0.861 0.987 0.96 399.95 0.187
mean −0.003 0.003 8.664 −0.007 −0.004 0.004 −8.112 −0.057
var 0.048 0.048 2496.265 0.018 0.067 0.067 1797.813 0.024
Case A2: Malware attack for one side omitted, present for the other
min −1.408 −0.051 −300.178 −0.102 −1.38 −0.014 −503.17 −0.014
max 0.051 1.408 449.3 0.864 0.014 1.38 344.8 0.921
mean −0.082 0.082 4.42 0.038 −0.113 0.113 0.506 0.036
var 0.029 0.029 1611.839 0.01 0.039 0.039 1174.36 0.006
Case A3: Malware attack for one side omitted, not present for the other
min −0.001 −1.519 −560.165 −0.932 −0.001 −0.987 −301.55 −0.942
max 1.519 0.001 905.4 0.017 0.987 0.001 180.8 0.005
mean 0.079 −0.079 4.244 −0.045 0.109 −0.109 −8.618 −0.093
var 0.026 0.026 1619.68 0.011 0.032 0.032 1052.682 0.027
Table 10: Some statistical properties of the comparison measure d applied to the various gen-
eral/reference case comparisons indicated in table 5. We give corresponding values for both
unconstrained forces and equal-sized forces. A short discussion of these data can be found in
section 5.3.
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Parameter Blue as Kinetically Superior Force Blue as Kinetically Inferior Force
d∆N d∆D d∆T dLb d∆N d∆D d∆T dLb
Case A1: Malware attack for both sides omitted
min −1.27 −0.813 −243.1 −0.813 −0.758 −1.519 −560.165 −0.921
max 0.813 1.27 368.153 0.861 1.519 0.758 905.4 0.077
mean −0.039 0.039 8.063 0.01 0.034 −0.034 9.28 −0.025
var 0.05 0.05 2018.973 0.026 0.044 0.044 2986.509 0.009
Case A2: Malware attack for one side omitted, present for the other
min −1.408 −0.024 −243.6 −0.008 −1.325 −0.051 −300.178 −0.102
max 0.024 1.408 415.655 0.864 0.051 1.325 449.3 0.733
mean −0.094 0.094 12.037 0.063 −0.07 0.07 −3.405 0.012
var 0.038 0.038 1867.009 0.016 0.019 0.019 1229.309 0.002
Case A3: Malware attack for one side omitted, not present for the other
min −0.001 −0.82 −248.31 −0.82 0.0 −1.519 −560.165 −0.932
max 0.82 0.001 172.05 0.0 1.519 −0.0 905.4 0.017
mean 0.055 −0.055 −3.974 −0.052 0.104 −0.104 12.686 −0.037
var 0.012 0.012 442.53 0.011 0.039 0.039 2688.66 0.012
Table 11: Some statistical properties of the comparison measure d applied to the various gen-
eral/reference case comparisons indicated in table 5. We give corresponding values for Blue as
kinetic superior and for Blue as inferior force. A short discussion of these data can be found in
section 5.3.
42
Parameter Unconstrained Forces Kinetically Equal Forces
d∆N d∆D d∆T dLb d∆N d∆D d∆T dLb
Case D1: Malware defense for both sides omitted
min −1.36 −1.593 −634.473 −0.813 −1.568 −1.472 −596.66 −0.904
max 1.593 1.36 893.6 0.845 1.472 1.568 324.35 0.93
mean 0.001 −0.001 −4.297 0.008 −0.003 0.003 0.479 0.019
var 0.031 0.031 2551.207 0.011 0.05 0.05 1518.741 0.016
Case D2: Malware defense for one side omitted, present for the other
min −1.36 −0.035 −566.072 −0.024 −1.574 −0.026 −576.478 −0.02
max 0.035 1.36 806.2 0.845 0.026 1.574 234.45 0.93
mean −0.046 0.046 −3.228 0.026 −0.065 0.065 −4.075 0.041
var 0.016 0.016 1956.602 0.007 0.026 0.026 1201.559 0.013
Case D3: Malware defense for one side omitted, not present for the other
min −0.052 −1.614 −557.55 −0.864 −0.026 −1.556 −595.388 −0.904
max 1.614 0.052 571.05 0.034 1.556 0.026 399.4 0.036
mean 0.047 −0.047 −1.069 −0.019 0.063 −0.063 4.554 −0.022
var 0.018 0.018 1932.409 0.005 0.025 0.025 1339.676 0.005
Table 12: Some statistical properties of the comparison measure d applied to the various gen-
eral/reference case comparisons indicated in table 5. We give corresponding values for both
unconstrained forces and equal-sized forces. A short discussion of these data can be found in
section 5.3.
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Parameter Blue as Kinetically Superior Force Blue as Kinetically Inferior Force
d∆N d∆D d∆T dLb d∆N d∆D d∆T dLb
Case D1: Malware defense for both sides omitted
min −1.31 −1.593 −634.473 −0.813 −1.36 −1.253 −520.065 −0.689
max 1.593 1.31 329.8 0.845 1.253 1.36 893.6 0.749
mean 0.007 −0.007 −4.595 0.004 −0.005 0.005 −3.991 0.012
var 0.033 0.033 2379.306 0.016 0.029 0.029 2728.326 0.005
Case D2: Malware defense for one side omitted, present for the other
min −1.324 −0.016 −304.697 −0.024 −1.36 −0.035 −566.072 −0.019
max 0.016 1.324 329.8 0.845 0.035 1.36 806.2 0.777
mean −0.041 0.041 3.361 0.033 −0.052 0.052 −9.997 0.02
var 0.013 0.013 1022.341 0.008 0.019 0.019 2826.418 0.005
Case D3: Malware defense for one side omitted, not present for the other
min −0.015 −1.614 −557.55 −0.864 −0.052 −1.253 −519.745 −0.776
max 1.614 0.015 354.85 0.027 1.253 0.052 571.05 0.034
mean 0.047 −0.047 −7.956 −0.029 0.047 −0.047 6.006 −0.008
var 0.02 0.02 2092.127 0.008 0.015 0.015 1670.089 0.002
Table 13: Some statistical properties of the comparison measure d applied to the various gen-
eral/reference case comparisons indicated in table 5. We give corresponding values for Blue as
kinetic superior and for Blue as inferior force. A short discussion of these data can be found in
section 5.3.
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